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CRIMINAL LAW
by
Jim Darnell*

I.
A.

DEFENSES

Self-Defense

HE Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the Fort Worth court of
appeals during the Survey period addressed the extent of deadly force
that a person may use in self-defense.' In Phelen v. State 2 the court
of criminal appeals disapproved the defendant's proposed charge to the jury
that if the right to shoot in self-defense existed, the defendant had the right
to continue to shoot until the danger to his life had passed. 3 Prior to passage
of the 1974 Penal Code4 such an instruction was proper if warranted by the
facts. 5 The court relied heavily on the 1974 Penal Code's requirement that a6
person retreat if a reasonable person in the actor's situation would do so,
and held that such a charge is no longer proper.7 The court also concluded
that the requested instruction merely repeated the instructions actually given
to the jury. 8
In a case of first impression in Texas the Forth Worth court of appeals set
limits on the admissibility of expert testimony concerning the battered wo*A.B.,
Dartmouth College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Grambling & Mounce, El Paso, Texas.
1. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31 (Vernon 1974), 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 1986) for
the statutory requirements of the self-defense claim.
2. 683 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
3. Id. at 445.
4. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.01-71.05 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1986).
5. See, e.g., Conn v. State, 158 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941) (continued
shooting justified so long as defendant reasonably believed life or person in danger); Boaz v.
State, 89 Tex. Crim. 515, 231 S.W. 790, 794 (1920) (defendant could shoot until danger
passed). But cf Goodman v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 280, 282, 114 S.W.2d 885, 886 (1983) (no
right to instruction on continued shooting unless actual danger present of serious bodily
injury).
6. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
7. 683 S.W.2d at 445.
8. Id. The court instructed the jury that:
When a person is attacked with an unlawful deadly weapon, or he reasonably
believes he is under attack or attempted attack with unlawful deadly force, and
there is created in the mind of such person a reasonable expectation or fear of
death or serious bodily injury, then the law excuses or justifies such person in
resorting to deadly force by any means at his command to the degree that he
reasonably believes immediately necessary, viewed from his standpoint at the
time, to protect himself from such attack or attempted attack ....
Id. (emphasis by the court). Justice Teague pointed out in his dissent the impact an instruction
or lack thereof may have on a juror. Id. at 446 (Teague, J., dissenting).
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man syndrome. The defendant in Fielder v. State9 testified that she was a
battered wife and that after several years of abuse she killed her husband in
self-defense. The court approved the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome and the reasons for the defendant's failure to leave the abusive relationship prior to the incident that
lead to the victim's death.' 0 In a previous case the court of criminal appeals
held that expert testimony was admissible to show an accused's state of mind
at the time of the offense."I In Fielder, however, the psychiatrist never examined the defendant and never reviewed the facts of the case. The court
concluded that the expert was incapable of rendering an opinion as to the
defendant's state of mind. 12 Relying solely upon the defendant's statutory
duty to retreat if at all possible, ' 3 the court limited its inquiry to the immediate situation and disregarded the defendant's reasons for not leaving the relationship earlier. 14 The court held that a claim of self-defense does not in and
of itself raise the issues of the defendant's prior batterings or her reasons for
remaining in such a relationship.' 5 The court required that a defendant
identify herself as a battered woman before the trial court may admit expert
16
testimony on the battered woman syndrome.
B. Insanity
In Nethery v. State '7 the court of criminal appeals reviewed the trial
court's charge to the jury on temporary insanity caused by intoxication.' 8
The defendant was charged with capital murder for the fatal shooting of a
Dallas police officer. In support of his temporary insanity defense the defendant offered testimony that he had been drinking and had smoked a marijuana cigarette. The trial court charged the jury that "[e]vidence of
temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced by the actor in
mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense for which he is being tried.
'Intoxication' means disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting
from the introduction of any substance into the body."' 19 The trial court
9. 683 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.)..

10. Id. at 593, 596.
11. McClure v. State, 575 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The McClure court admitted the testimony pursuant to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (Vernon 1974). 575

S.W.2d at 567.
12. 683 S.W.2d at 591.
13. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
14. 683 S.W.2d at 593, 596.

15. Id. at 592. The court recognized that a battered woman would not respond as a reasonable person would in self-defense. The court nonetheless concluded that testimony on the
battered woman syndrome is irrelevant absent proof that the defendant is in fact a battered
woman. Id. at 592-93.
16. Id. at 595. Identifying the defendant as a battered woman is essential to outweigh the

prejudicial effect of such testimony. Id.
17. 692 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
18. Id. at 711-12; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (Vernon 1974) (defining intoxica-

tion as a disturbance in mental or physical capacity as a result of taking a substance into the
body).
19. 692 S.W.2d at 711.
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refused, however, to instruct the jury on the correct definition of insanity.2 0
The court of criminal appeals upheld the trial court's decision, concluding
that the facts did not entitle the defendant to a jury charge on temporary
insanity due to intoxication. 2t Both courts relied upon the testimony of an
eyewitness and the slain officer's partner that the defendant did not act or
22
appear intoxicated at any time.
C. Accident
23

In Davis v. State

a Houston court of appeals held that accident is no

longer a criminal defense in Texas. 24 The defendant had been convicted of
negligent homicide. While distinguishing accident and mistake of fact, the
court held that an instruction on accident would be subsumed by an instruction that the jury should acquit the defendant if the jury had a reasonable
doubt that he voluntarily engaged in the act that he was accused of having
committed.

25

D. Entrapment
In Soto v. State 26 the court of criminal appeals faced the question of what
level of police involvement constitutes entrapment. Soto and his police-informant girlfriend were together when she made a phone call to an undercover narcotics officer of the Austin Police Department. The girlfriend
asked the defendant to "score" for her friend, the narcotics officer. Soto
then agreed to provide the officer with one gram of heroin if the officer
would buy a second gram for Soto's use. Soto testified that he only "scored"
for the officer because of his sexual relationship with his girlfriend and because she asked him to do it. The trial court rejected Soto's contention and
concluded that he made the purchase to obtain heroin for himself.27 Justice
Odom, writing for the majority, also noted that Soto's girlfriend was not a
law enforcement agent 28 and thus the evidence failed to meet the two-part
20. Id. The insanity statute, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (Vernon 1974) provided
at the time of trial that:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct
charged, the actor, as a result of mental disease or defect, either did not know
that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the
requirement of the law he allegedly violated.
The legislature has since amended the statute in order to narrow the confines of the insanity
defense. See id. § 8.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
21. Nethery, 692 S.W.2d at 711-12.
22. Id. The court held that the agility displayed by the defendant in his attempt to evade
capture refuted his claim of intoxication. Id.
23. 692 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no pet.).
24. Id. at 189.
25. Id.; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (an offense is committed when a person voluntarily engages in the misconduct).
26. 681 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
27. Id. at 604.
28. Id. Justice Odom's statement seems to conflict directly with the language of the Penal
Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (Vernon 1974), which provides that the term law
enforcement agent includes not only personnel of governmental agencies but "any person acting in accordance with instructions from such agencies." Id.
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defense of entrapment enunciated in Rangel v. State.29 Justice Clinton argued in dissent that the issue whether Soto's girlfriend was a law enforcement agent was not properly before the court. 30 As Justice Miller pointed
out in his separate dissenting opinion, the majority avoided the real issue
before the court. 3' Justice Miller viewed that issue as being whether the
informant's conduct raised the issue of entrapment.3 2 The majority ignored
the evidence of the government's inducement and the state's burden of
proof.33 Justice Miller concluded that the decision in Soto will encourage
34
police ignorance of informant activities in order to secure convictions.
The Fort Worth court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in Gobin v.
State.3 5 An informant introduced the defendant Gobin to an undercover
narcotics agent who later arranged a purchase of amphetamines from the
defendant. At trial for delivery of a controlled substance 36 Gobin claimed
entrapment and testified that the informant, who lived with him, threatened
to cut off Gobin's supply of drugs and to stop paying his share of the rent if
Gobin did not sell amphetamines to the undercover police officer. Applying
the Rangel test, 37 the court found that no police officer instructed the informant to threaten Gobin and that the informant had not used such methods in previous cases. 38 The court thus concluded that neither threat was
39
sufficient to raise the defense of entrapment.
II.

PRESUMPTIONS

A.

Burglary/Theft

Over the past year courts again wrestled with the presumption/circumstance/inference of guilt from unexplained possession of recently stolen property. In Sutherlin v. State 40 the court of criminal appeals
established a remote possession exception to the presumption. 4' The defend29. 585 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The court must find a specific instruction by
the police to the informant, or general control arising from repeated use of the informant. Id.
at 699. In Rangel the court concluded that "the quest ... is to determine the degree of police
involvement and to judge whether that involvement provided only the opportunity for the
criminal mind to commit the offense." Id.
30. 681 S.W.2d at 605 (Clinton, J., dissenting). Justice Clinton also dissented from the
court's finding that the evidence did not support a finding that Soto's girlfriend was a law
enforcement agent. Specifically, Justice Clinton pointed out that the officer and the girlfriend
had worked together for some time and that she had set up scores from her mother with him.
Id. at 608.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
delivery
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 609 (Miller, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
690 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.).
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (defines
and sets out penalties and punishment for delivery of a controlled substance).
See supra note 29.
690 S.W.2d at 705.
Id.
682 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
Id. at 548.
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ant was charged with theft42 of a bulldozer after Navarro County sheriff's
deputies discovered the bulldozer in the possession of an individual to whom
the defendant had loaned it. The state presented no evidence that defendant
participated in or knew of the theft and relied completely upon the presumption of guilt arising from possession. 43 The court indicated that recent unexplained possession of stolen property is normally sufficient to convict the
possessor of the theft of the property.44 Remote possession of stolen property, however, requires other facts connecting the defendant with the theft in
order to support a conviction. 45 After noting that the question of recent
possession is normally one of fact, the court concluded that possession of
stolen property five months after the theft, without any other evidence of
guilt, was remote as a matter of law. 46 The court thus reversed the
47
conviction.
The Fort Worth court of appeals reiterated an earlier opinion 48 that a trial
court commits fundamental error by instructing a jury that possession of
recently stolen property mandates a presumption that the "person either
'49
knew it was stolen, should have known it was stolen, or stole it himself."
0
In Blakeley v. State 5 the defendant was arrested for possession of a recently
5
stolen Oldsmobile and charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. '
The court of appeals determined that the defendant's exclusive, unexplained
possession of the recently stolen automobile was just one of the factors that
the trial court should have considered before an inference of guilt was
52
justified.
A Houston court of appeals overturned a burglary conviction based upon
circumstantial evidence in McKibben v. State.5 3 An officer of the Village
Police Department observed a car parked in the back of an unlighted church
parking lot. The officer determined the vehicle was not stolen, but nonetheless conducted a search of the vehicle. After spotting several bullets in the
car, the officer left the area, circled, and set up surveillance. The vehicle left
the lot shortly thereafter and the officer pulled the car over for failure to
signal a turn properly. The officer arrested the defendant, a passenger, for
public intoxication and unlawfully carrying a weapon. 54 Another search of
the vehicle failed to reveal any further evidence of criminal activity. The
next day another officer, investigating a burglary near the church, searched
the vehicle and allegedly found several items of jewelry belonging to the
42. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (a person commits theft if
he appropriates property with the intent to deprive the owner of such property).
43. 682 S.W.2d at 548.
44. Id. at 549.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 549-50.
Id.
See Roberts v. State, 672 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no pet.).
Blakeley v. State, 692 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.).
692 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth 1985, no pet.).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (Vernon 1974).
692 S.W.2d at 209.
687 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet.).
The officer arrested the driver for driving without a license. Id. at 514.
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complainant. The caretaker of the burglarized home testified, however, that
she had been through the house twelve hours after the defendant's arrest and
the vehicle'§ confiscation, and all was in order at the residence."5 The state
relied on the defendant's presence at the scene of the burglary and his joint
possession of recently stolen property as sufficient circumstances of his
guilt. 56 The state presented no evidence to support the assertion that the
defendant ever entered the burglarized premises. The court of appeals held
that the defendant's possession of recently stolen goods, if in fact he had
possession, was only a permissible inference of guilt 57 and was not sufficient
58
to sustain a conviction for burglary.
The Beaumont court of appeals held in Lewis v. State 59 that entry into an
unoccupied house during daytime did not trigger the presumption of intent
to commit theft, which might have been triggered by nighttime entry. 60 The
defendant was discovered hiding inside the house but without any property
associated with the home in his possession. The case was remanded to the
trial court for submission to a jury on a criminal trespass charge. 6 1
III.

SPECIFIC PENAL CODE PROVISIONS

A.

CapitalMurder and Murder

In Showery v. State62 the El Paso court of appeals addressed the issue of
murder of a newborn infant. The trial court convicted Dr. Raymond Showery, an El Paso physician specializing in abortions, of murder on evidence
that an aborted fetus appeared to be breathing before the defendant placed
the placenta over the newborn's head and plunged it into a bucket of
water. 63 Showery challenged the constitutionality of his prosecution due to
the court's incorporation of an allegedly overbroad Family Code definition
of "born alive" in the jury charge. 64 The court rejected Showery's argument
55. Id. at 514-16. At the time the burglary was discovered, the house had been ransacked
and a window had been broken.
56. Id. at 516.
57. Id. The court explained that a permissible inference of guilt does not relieve the state
of its burden of proving each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
58. Id. at 517. The court noted the absence of any prior case that holds unexplained
possession of stolen property alone sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction. Id.
59. 694 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, pet. filed).
60. See Moss v. State, 574 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (entry through window at nighttime supports presumption of theft). But cf Warren v. State, 641 S.W.2d 579, 582
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1982) (intent to steal established by early morning entry through window),
pet. dism'd, 652 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
61. 694 S.W.2d at 616; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
62. 690 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no pet.).
63. Id. at 695. Witnesses testified that the fetus's rib cage was expanding before the physician placed the placenta over its face. After the fetus was submerged in a bucket of water, air
bubbles rose. Testimony identified these bubbles as "breathing bubbles." Id.
64. Id. at 69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.05(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) provides
that:
"[B]orn alive" means the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of a
product of conception, irrespective of the duration of pregnancy, which, after
such separation, breathes or shows any other evidence of life such as beating of
the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, definite movement of voluntary mus-

1986]

CRIMINAL LAW

that prosecution for murder of a newborn requires a resolution of the viability issue.65 The court held that the Penal Code and Family Code require
findings of live birth and actual life at the time of the alleged murder to
support a criminal prosecution. 66 Thus the court refused to hold that the
legislature had indirectly enacted a criminal abortion statute. 67 While the
opinion is well-reasoned in its approach to the problem, the court should not
sidestep the issue of viability of an aborted fetus. The author hopes that if
the case is ultimately decided by either the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
or the United States Supreme Court, some guidance might be given in order
to prevent a spate of abortion/killing trials.
The Texas courts continued to refine and revise the proper jury instructions in a murder 68 prosecution wherein the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter 69 is an issue. In Bradley v. State70 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals observed that sudden passion 7 l is not a defense to murder. 72 The court went on to hold, however, that when the evidence raises
73
the issue of sudden passion, its negation becomes an implied element of
murder that the state must refute beyond a reasonable doubt. 74 The divided
court7 5 concluded that evidence of self-defense 76 will not entitle a defendant
to a charge on voluntary manslaughter unless evidence shows that the accused acted under the "immediate influence of sudden passion arising from
'' 77
an adequate cause.
The courts of appeals have split in their holdings on the state's burden in
cles, whether or not the umbilical cord has been cut or the placenta is attached;

each product of such birth is considered born alive.
65. 690 S.W.2d at 692.

66. Id. at 694.
67. Id. The defendant argued that the state had extended "homicide sanctions on behalf
of a nonviable fetus not constitutionally cognizable as a victim." Id. The court noted, however, that the defendant's allegedly criminal conduct occurred after the fetus exhibited signs of
life and that the infant was alive at the time of the defendant's acts. The defendant was thus
properly tried for murder. Id.
68. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 1974). A person commits murder in
one of three ways. One, he intentionally or knowingly causes an individual to die; two, he
intends to cause only serious injury to an individual but his actions cause the death of an
individual; or three, he causes the death of someone while attempting to commit, committing,
or fleeing from a felony. Id.
69. See id. § 19.04. A person commits voluntary manslaughter if he causes the death of
another person in the circumstances involved in § 19.02 of the Code except that he was under
the influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Id.
70. 688 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
71. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04 (Vernon 1974) (sudden passion means passion
directly caused by the individual killed or by someone associated with the individual killed).
72. 688 S.W.2d at 849.
73. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(13) (Vernon 1974) (four elements of an offense
are the forbidden conduct, the required culpability, the required result, and the contradiction
of any exception to the offender).
74. 688 S.W.2d at 851.
75. Justice Clinton wrote the opinion in which three justices joined. Id. at 847. Three
other justices concurred only in the result. Id. at 853.
76. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
77. 688 S.W.2d at 852; see also Moore v. State, 694 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985), in which the court found that the failure properly to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter was not reversible error.
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refuting the element of sudden passion. In an opinion written after Bradley
the El Paso court of appeals held that the state need not disprove sudden
passion with the same conclusiveness that it must provide any positive element of murder.78 In Gold v. State79 the defendant appealed his murder
conviction on grounds that the state had not disproven sudden passion beyond a reasonable doubt.80 The court held that in contrast to a murder case
in which the state fails to prove an affirmative element, if the state fails to
disprove sudden passion beyond a reasonable doubt when raised by the defense, the jury may still reach a murder verdict by rejecting the defendant's
sudden passion testimony.8 1 The court's standard of review showed a complete acceptance of the jury's authority to reject the defendant's sudden passion claim.8 2 Any other approach, the court noted, would render the jury's
verdict purely advisory and would in some cases "place an impossible burden on the state."'8 3 The jury's rejection of the defendant's sudden passion
claim did not supply a missing affirmative element.84 Whether this reasoning will withstand the teachings of Bradley remains to be seen. This issue
will probably be determined in the near future since the Austin court of
85
appeals has yet another treatment of sudden passion. In Huffman v. State
the trial court found the defendant guilty of murder. The defendant asserted
in defense that he acted under the influence of sudden passion. The court
held that when a defendant raises the sudden passion defense, "the State
must prove the absence of such influence beyond a reasonable doubt in order
86
to establish murder."
A Houston court of appeals held in Slaton v. State 87 that when the evidence raises the defensive issue of suicide, the court should so instruct the
jury.8 8 Slaton was charged with the murder of his live-in boyfriend, who
after falling from a seventh floor balcony, had been found by Houston police.
An eyewitness who earlier stated that the deceased had fallen accidentally
testified that Slaton pushed the decedent from the balcony during an argument. Several other witnesses testified as to the decedent's suicidal tendencies. The court found a high probability that the decedent had committed
suicide and reversed the conviction based on the trial court's refusal to submit that defense to the jury.8 9 The court ruled in the defendant's favor even
78. Gold v. State, 691 S.W.2d 760, 762-63 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no pet.).
79. 691 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no pet.).
80. The state had proved the elements of murder and the defense had conceded the issue.
Id. at 762-63. The defendant's sudden passion claim, however, raised the issue of voluntary
manslaughter. Id.
81. The court held that failure to prove an affirmative element precludes the jury's right to
supply the element not proven by the state simply by rejecting the defendant's testimony. Id.
at 762.
82. Id. at 763.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 691 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no pet.).

86. Id. at 730.
87. 685 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd).

88. Id. at 775.
89. Id.
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though the objection at trial did not specifically address the same issue as the
point of appeal. 90
In Stewart v. State" the court of criminal appeals again declined to require the trial court to define "deliberately" in its charge to the jury. 9 2 The
court held that "deliberately" was taken and understood in its normal usage. 93 The court reiterated that "deliberately" and "intentionally" 94 or
"knowingly" 9 5 are not linguistically equivalent. 96 In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, however, the court refused to assume that the jury
had construed the words as equivalents. 97 The court may have created an
insurmountable problem for defendants. Obtaining the necessary evidence
will require the defense attorney to inquire into the various subconscious and
learned thought processes that the jurors used in arriving at their decision, a
difficult if not impossible task.
In Thomas v. State98 the court of criminal appeals, sitting en banc, overruled a line of cases99 that held pointing a loaded pistol at another person
sufficient to indicate that a person should be aware that his actions create a
risk of "such a nature and degree that ... it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." 1° ° Courts often
allowed a charge on criminally negligent homicide based solely on the defendant's pointing a loaded gun at another person.101 The majority opinion
02
in Thomas however, enunciated a new totality of the circumstances test.'
90. Id. At trial, defense counsel had objected to the court's charge on the basis that it did
not specifically instruct the jury to acquit if they found the defendant was attempting to prevent suicide or had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he was attempting to prevent
suicide. Id.
91. 686 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
92. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(1)(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (court
shall submit to the jury the issue of whether the defendant deliberately caused the death of
another); Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (counsel could not
ask prospective jurors for their definitions of "deliberately"); King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (not necessary to define common words to a jury).
93. 686 S.W.2d at 122.
94. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 1974) (a person acts with intent when he
has a conscious objective).
95. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b) (Vernon 1974) (a person acts knowingly when he
is aware of the nature of his conduct).
96. 686 S.W.2d at 121.
97. Id. at 122.
98. 699 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
99. See Schoelman v. State, 644 S.W.2d 727, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (court relied on
pointing of loaded weapon to raise criminally negligent homicide); Giles v. State, 617 S.W.2d
690, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (criminally negligent homicide offense raised when defendant
pointed a loaded gun); London v. State, 547 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (accidental
discharge of a weapon constituted criminally negligent homicide); Dockery v. State, 542
S.W.2d 644, 648-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (evidence that defendant raised himself up off
floor and gun that he was holding discharged indicated criminally negligent homicide). The
court held all of these findings overbroad. 699 S.W.2d at 851.
100. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(d) (Vernon 1974) (criminal negligence results when a
person ought to be aware of a risk that his conduct may cause).
101. 699 S.W.2d at 849-50; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.07 (Vernon 1974) (criminally
negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor).
102. 699 S.W.2d at 850.
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The type of weapon, the defendant's knowledge of weapons, evidence that he
pointed the weapon at another person, and evidence that a third party or
other factor may have caused the weapon to discharge are all factors that the
judge'must now consider in determining whether a jury charge on criminally
negligent homicide is warranted. 10 3 The mere pointing of a loaded weapon
is no longer sufficient to warrant such a charge. '04
The majority opinion sparked two rather strong dissents. Judge Clinton
argued that the majority opinion ignored legislative intent. 105 The judge asserted that the language of section 6.03(d) of the Penal Code clearly indicates the legislature's desire to dissuade a person from pointing a loaded gun
at another.' 0 6 The judge thus characterized the majority opinion as a "blunder of policy that seriously undermines legislative considerations of that
10 7
which is in the public interest."'
Judge Teague also strongly disagreed with the majority opinion on the
basis of legislative intent. He noted that the majority opinion appeared to
forbid a criminally negligent homicide instruction anytime the state shows
that the defendant is even minimally familiar with firearms.10 8 The judge
then stated that "[i]f this is the law, then the law is truly an ass, and such
flies in the face of not only what the legislature of this State has mandated,
10 9
but what this court has held in the past."'
B.

Theft

In McClain v. State 10 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
appropriation I ' requirement of the theft statute."12 The defendants were
charged with the theft of gold chains. The stipulated evidence established
that neither defendant participated in the initial appropriation of the chains.
13
In an unpublished opinion the court of appeals reversed the conviction,
relying upon Casey v. State. 14 Casey required participation in the initial appropriation.11 5 The court of criminal appeals reversed the lower courts and
held that such participation was not required. 1 6 The court traced the development of the theft statute and acknowledged that acquisitive conduct may
103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 849-52.
Id. at 856 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 861 (Teague, J., dissenting).
Id.
687 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (defining when appropria-

tion is unlawful).

112. Id. § 31.03 (defining theft as unlawful appropriation of property with the intent to
deprive the owner thereof).
113. 687 S.W.2d at 351.
114. 633 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
115. Id. at 886.
116. McClain, 687 S.W.2d at 355. The court of criminal appeals expressly overruled
Casey. Id.
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be irrelevant to the crime of theft.' 17 The essence of theft, the court stated,
is in depriving the owner of his property without his consent." 18 The statute
thus requires only that a person exercise control over property with the
knowledge that his control is without the owner's consent and the intent to
deprive the owner of the property.19 The court concluded20 that how the
actor got the property is inconsequential to appropriation.
In Reed v. State '21 the Beaumont court of appeals held that failure to turn
over gasoline sales proceeds from a service station to the station's lessor constitutes theft of money. Under similar facts the Corpus Christi court of appeals had held that discrepancies between the amount of gasoline sales
reported to the pumps' lessor and the amount registered on the gasoline
pumps constituted theft of gasoline rather than money.' 22 The Beaumont
court refused to follow the Corpus Christi court's decision and held that the
23
defendant had misappropriated money that belonged to the lessor.
C.

Bribery

Two significant decisions during the survey period dealt with the offense
of bribery. 124 In McCallum v. State' 2 5 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed a jury bribing conviction.' 26 The defendant allegedly gave a glass
of champagne to a juror as consideration for her vote in a civil proceeding. 127 The defendant paid for several bottles of champagne for the juror
and her friends during an evening at a fashionable Dallas nightclub. No
mention was made of the civil case that was in a weekend recess.' 2 8 As the
statute existed at the time of the alleged offense, it required that consideration pass to the bribe's recipient for his or her actions in a judicial or administrative proceeding.' 29 The court construed consideration to require a
117. Id. at 353.
118. Id. The court characterized previous emphasis on the manner of acquisition as misleading. Id.
119. The court pointed to the consolidations of previous offenses such as theft and receiving stolen property into a single offense as an unambiguous declaration by the legislature that
mode of acquisition no longer constitutes an element of theft. Id. n. 10.
120. Id. at 355. "Appropriate" means any exercise of control over the property in question. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(5)(B) (Vernon 1974).
121. 685 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, no pet.).
122. Sanchez v. State, 645 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, no pet.).

123. Reed, 685 S.W.2d at 75.
124. A person commits bribery when he intentionally or knowingly offers, confers, or
agrees to confer, or solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from a public servant, official, or voter

any benefit as a result of such consideration made to or for the public servant, official, or voter.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
125. 686 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
126. Id. at 139.
127. Id. at 136.
128. Id. at 136-39.
129. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.02(a) (Vernon 1974). At the time of the offense the
statute provided that:

(a)

A person commits an offense if he offers, confers or agrees to confer any

benefit on a public servant, party official, or voter:
(I) with intent to influence the public servant or party official in a specific
exercise of his official powers or a specific performance of his official duties; or
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bilateral agreement13 ° to take certain action. The court could find no such
32
evidence,131 and therefore, reversed the conviction.1
In Martinez v. State 133 the Austin court of appeals sought to distinguish
the McCallum opinion. The defendant police officer was charged with accepting a bribe in lieu of issuing a ticket to a motorist. 13 4 The defendant
asked for and received $150 from the motorist, who testified that he thought
he was paying his fines.' 3 5 The defendant argued against the existence of a
bilateral agreement 136 if the motorist had not intended the money as a
bribe. 137 The court distinguished McCallum on the basis that the McCallum
indictment alleged conferring a benefit while the evidence only showed the
offer of such benefit.' 38 In Martinez the defendant was charged with soliciting, agreeing to accept, and accepting a benefit.' 39 Proof of solicitation alone
14° since the offense of bribery is
supported the conviction,
complete when
14'
the solicitation is made.
D. Unlawfully Carryinga Weapon
During the Survey period the court of criminal appeals addressed the term
"carrying" as it is used in the statute defining the offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon. 142 In Christinav. State 143 the police arrested the defendant in
a car parked on the side of a Dallas street. The defendant was sitting behind
the wheel of the vehicle with the engine running. The officer ran a warrants
check, determined that the defendant had an outstanding traffic warrant,
and arrested him. The post-arrest inventory of the vehicle revealed nun(2) with intent to influence the voter not to vote or to vote in a particular
manner.
Id. This section of the Penal Code was amended in 1983. See id. § 36.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1986).
130. 686 S.W.2d at 135-36.
131. Id. at 139. Note that following the weekend break the civil jury returned a $165,000
verdict against the defendant who allegedly offered the bribe.
132. Id.
133. 696 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no pet.).
134. Id. at 931.
135. Id. at 932.
136. See McCallum, 686 S.W.2d at 136.
137. 696 S.W.2d at 932.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 933.
141. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.02(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly offers, confers or agrees to confer on another, or solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from
another;
(1) any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, opinion, recommendation, note, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party official,
or voter ....
142. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1974) (offense of unlawfully carrying a
weapon occurs when a person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally carries on or about his
person a handgun, illegal knife, or club).
143. 686 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
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chucks under the driver's seat. 144 The only question presented to the court
of criminal appeals was whether the defendant was in possession of the nunchucks. The defendant asked the court to equate carrying with the element
of possession prescribed in the possessory offenses of the Controlled Substances Act. 145 Possession, as defined in the Texas Penal Code, means "actual care, custody, control, or management," 146 while carrying has not been
accorded a technical legal meaning. 147 The court refused to assign carrying
a technical meaning, but did acknowledge that it contained an element of
asportation. 14 9 The majority concluded that the jury had sufficient facts to
determine that the defendant transported the nun-chucks on or about his
49

person. 1

E. Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity
Two courts of appeals addressed the organized criminal activity statutes 150 during the course of 1985. In Nickerson v. State 151 a Houston court
of appeals analyzed the mens rea element of the statutes.' 52 The defendant
argued that the organized criminal activity statutes specifically exclude any
mens rea requirement'

53

and are thus unconstitutional.154 While it is not a

defense that one or more members of the combination are not criminally
responsible for the underlying illegal conduct, 55 the court held a mens rea
144. Id. at 931. A nun-chuck is a swinging type of club composed of two clubs connected
by a chain. Id.
145. Id. at 932; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
146. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(28) (Vernon 1974).
147. 686 S.W.2d at 933.
148. Id. Asportation means the moving of an object from one place to another. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 147 (4th ed. 1968).
149. 686 S.W.2d at 934.
150. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 71.01-.05 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
151. 686 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd).
152. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if with the intent to establish, maintain, or
participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination, he commits or
conspires to commit one or more of the following:
(1) murder, capital murder, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary,
theft, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, aggravated assault, or forgery;
(2) any felony gambling offense;
(3) promotion of prostitution, aggravated promotion of prostitution, or compelling prostitution;
(4) unlawful manufacture, transportation, repair, or sale of firearms or prohibited weapons;
(5) unlawful manufacture, delivery, dispensation or distribution of a controlled
substance or dangerous drug, or unlawful possession of a controlled substance
drug, or dangerous drug through forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, or deception;
(6) any unlawful wholesale promotion or possession of any obscene material or
obscene device with the intent to wholesale promote the same; or
(7) any unlawful employment, authorization or inducing of a child younger
than 17 years of age in an obscene sexual performance.
153. Id. § 71.03(1) provides: "It is no defense to prosecution under section 71.02 of this
code that: (1) one or more members of the combination are not criminally responsible for the
object offense ...."
154. 686 S.W.2d at 297.
155. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.03(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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requirement to be present. 156 The prosecution must show the defendant's
intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or the profits
thereof. 157 The defendant must therefore15know
of the criminal activity of
8
the group to have the requisite mens rea.
In Abbett v. State' 5 9 the Corpus Christi court of appeals expanded the
mens rea requirement. The trial court had convicted the defendant of engaging in organized criminal activity for conspiring unlawfully to deliver
metamphetamine. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
used to convict him. The court pointed out that "conspire to commit"
means that a person agrees with others that one or more of them will commit the offense and someone actually will perform an overt act in pursuance
of the agreement. 160 An agreement constituting conspiracy may be inferred
from the acts of the parties. 16 1 The court found sufficient evidence of an
agreement to deliver metamphetamines 162 but insufficient evidence to show
that the agreement was made with the intent to "establish, maintain or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination."' 163 The court
1 64
also failed to find evidence that the defendant and four or more others
165
66
collaborated
to sell metamphetamines.1 The court placed a heavy burden on the state to show not only a conspiracy and the requisite intent, but
also an agreement among five or more people to work together to commit
criminal activity. The double intent requirement adds a significant element
to the state's burden of proof.
III.

VEHICULAR OFFENSES

In Allen v. State 167 the court of criminal appeals clarified the requirements
of the driving while license suspended statute. 16 8 A Dallas police officer
stopped the defendant after seeing the defendant drive his pickup truck off
the road. The defendant's license was under a mandatory suspension for
156. 686 S.W.2d at 297.
157. Id; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
158. 686 S.W.2d at 297.
159. 694 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no pet.).
160. Id. at 540; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("conspires
to commit" includes an agreement with one or more persons to engage in the offensive conduct
and the performance of an overt act).
161. 694 S.W.2d at 541.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71,01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides:
(a) "Combination" means five or more persons who collaborate in carrying on
criminal activities, although:
(1) participants may not know each other's identity;
(2) membership in the combination may change from time to time; and
(3) participants may stand in a wholesaler-retailer or other arm's-length
relationship in illicit distribution operations.
165. The court reasoned that "collaborating" meant working together with others in specified criminal activities. 694 S.W.2d at 541.
166. Id.
167. 681 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
168. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 34 (Vernon 1977) (requirements for
conviction are driving privilege revoked or suspended and driving while license suspended).
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driving while intoxicated. The state had suspended the defendant's license
for the same offense on a previous occasion. The defendant's license, however, had expired over four years before the alleged driving with a suspended
license occurred. The court held that the state must show either that the
accused had an unexpired license that was suspended at the time of the alleged offense or that the defendant's license had been suspended prior to its
normal expiration date and remained suspended from the expiration date
until the date of the alleged offense.' 69 Pursuant to the latter requirement
the state attempted to cumulate the current and previous suspensions by
showing a string of convictions for driving while intoxicated.' 70 The court
pointed out, however, that the driving while license suspended statute did
not provide for cumulation of consecutive DWI convictions.' 7' The court
reversed the driving while license suspended conviction since the driver's
license could not have been suspended because he had no license at the time
72
of the DWI convictions.
In a rather controversial opinion the Fort Worth court of appeals upheld
the driving while intoxicated statute 17 3 against a number of constitutional
challenges. In Forte v. State174 the DWI statute was challenged on the
ground that it reduced the prosecutor's burden of proof and created a conclusive presumption of intoxication by defining "intoxicated" as an alcohol
concentration exceeding .10. 175 The statute withstood this constitutional attack because the state must prove the alcohol concentration beyond a reasonable doubt. 176 A constitutional challenge based upon the amendatory
act's caption was also overruled. 177 Specifically the defendant argued that
the statute did not provide fair notice because the caption did not include the
statement providing for the admissibility at trial of evidence of the defendant's failure to take a chemical test.17 8 The court ruled that there is no constitutional requirement for the caption of an amendatory act to set out the
exact changes contained therein. The caption must only give fair and reasonable notice to a reader of the contents of the bill. 179 Finally, the court
held that the definition of public place' 8 0 contained in the Texas Penal Code
and applicable to the DWI statute did not render the statute unconstitu169. 681 S.W.2d at 40.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 41; cf TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 24 (Vernon 1977) wherein
cumulation is specifically provided for driving while license suspended convictions and
suspensions.
172. 681 S.W.2d at 41.
173. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (intoxication
means having an alcohol concentration of.10 or more in blood).
174. 686 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. granted).
175. Id. at 746; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1(a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
176. 686 S.W.2d at 749.
177. Id. at 749.
178. Id. at 748.
179. Id. at 749.
180. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(29) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides: "'Public
place' means any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and
includes, but is not limited to, streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals,
apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops."
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tional.' 8 1 Although the term was broader than under the prior statute, 18 2
the court held that the term is sufficiently specific to provide reasonable notice of what constitutes a public place. 18 3 The court's decision is rendered
controversial, however, by its holding that a person has a right to consult
84
with an attorney prior to submitting to blood, urine, or breath tests.1
While the court held that the consultation cannot be used to unreasonably
delay the testing,' 85 the police must nonetheless inform the suspect of his
right to counsel prior to administration of the test.' 8 6 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has granted a petition in the case.
In Elias v. State' 8 7 the San Antonio court of appeals specified the proper
instructions that a court should give a jury in a prosecution for failure to
stop and render aid.18 8 The defendant argued that the indictment should
have included the words "shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of
such accident or as close thereto as possible."' 8 9 The court reasoned that the
elements of the offense were: [1] a driver of a vehicle [2] involved in an
181. 686 S.W.2d at 751.
182. The prior DWI statute applied to public roads, highways, streets, alleys, and beaches.
See Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 682, § 3, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1608, 1609, amended by Act of
June 16, 1983, ch. 303, § 3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1568, 1574.
183. 686 S.W.2d at 750-51.
184. Id. at 754.
185. Id.
186. The court adopted the right to counsel test adopted by Minnesota in Prideaux v. State,
310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385, 394-95 (1976). The Minnesota case was based on a statutory
right rather than a constitutional right. 686 S.W.2d at 754.
187. 693 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no pet.).
188. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, §§ 38(a), (b) (Vernon 1977), 40 (Vernon
Supp. 1986). Section 38(a) provides:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death
of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident
or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every
event shall remain at the scene of said accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 40. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic
more than is necessary.
Id. art. 6701d, § 38(a) (Vernon 1977). Section 38(b) provides:
Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements under such circumstances shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not to exceed five (5) years or in jail not exceeding one (1) year or by fine
not exceeding Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
Id. art. 6701d, § 38(b). Section 40 provides:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death
of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any
person shall give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he
is driving and the name of his motor vehicle liability insurer, and shall upon
request and if available exhibit his operator's, commercial operator's, or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant or a person attending any vehicle colliding with and shall render to any person injured in such
accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for
medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or
if such carrying is requested by the injured person.
Id. art. 6701d, § 40 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
189. 693 S.W.2d at 587; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 6701(D), § 38(a) (Vernon Supp.
1986).
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accident [3] resulting in injury or death of any person [4] intentionally and
knowingly [5] fails to stop and render reasonable assistance." ' 190 Although
the statute plainly states that the driver must stop at the scene of the accident or as close as possible, the court overruled the point of error because it
was not an element of the offense.' 9 1 The defendant also argued that in
applying the law to the facts the court's instructions should have included
the disputed wording. The court ruled that not only was the omission of the
wording not fundamental error, 192 but it was not error at all. 193 If a defendant properly requests instructions on stopping as close to the accident as
possible, he should be entitled to have the jury so instructed. The court's
denial of the instruction takes away a defense clearly enunciated in the
statute. 194
V.

MISCELLANEOUS CRIMINAL STATUTES

A.

Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Cotton v. State,19 5 upheld a challenge to the constitutionality of a portion of the Alcoholic Beverage Code.
Section 61.71(a)(6) of the Alcoholic Beverage Code provided that: "The
commission or administrator may suspend for not more than 60 days or
cancel an original or renewal retail dealer's on- or off-premise license if it is
found, after notice and hearing, that the licensee: ... sold, served or delivered beer to a person showing evidence of intoxication ....,,196 The defendant argued that "person showing evidence of intoxication" was so overbroad
that it might allow an overzealous police officer to use its proscription as a
subterfuge for the arrest of a licenseholder. 197 The court agreed and held the
statute unconstitutional. 98 The court compared the statute's language to
other similar statutes that had passed constitutional muster.199 The court
concluded that "a person showing evidence of intoxication" 2° ° included not
only those persons who are intoxicated but also individuals who are not intoxicated but might show some of the symptoms of intoxication. 2° 1 The
court stated that "common experience teaches us that each symptom may be
demonstrated by the intoxicated or the abstemious, the soused or the so190. Id. at 586 (quoting Steen v. State, 640 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).
191. 693 S.W.2d at 587.
192. Id. at 588. See the applicable fundamental error rules enunciated in Almanza v. State,
686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

693 S.W.2d at 588.
See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 38(a) (Vernon 1977).
686 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
TEx. ALCO. BEy. CODE ANN. § 61.17(a)(6) (Vernon 1978).
686 S.W.2d at 141.

198. Id. at 141, 143. The wording of subsection (6) has since been amended. See TEX.
CODE ANN. § 61.71(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
199. 686 S.W.2d at 141, 143; see Campos v. State, 623 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
(analyzing TEX. ALCO. BEy. CODE ANN. § 101.63(a) (Vernon 1978) and Alexander v. State,
630 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.) (analyzing TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.08 (Vernon 1974) (amended 1985)).

ALCO. BEy.

200. TEX.ALCO. BEV. CODE
201. 686 S.W.2d at 142.

ANN.

§ 61.77 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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only
ber. '' 20 2 The majority concluded that a retail dealer licensee could
20 3
guess at the standard of criminal responsibility under the statute.

202. Id. at 143. The court continued:
Similarly, since alcohol breath is "evidence of intoxication," if while receiving a
patron's order for a second beer the tavern owner detects the odor of the first on
the customer's breath, is it or is it not a violation of § 61.71(a)(6) for the licensee
to consummate the sale of the second beer?
Id.
203. Id.

